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IINTRODUCTION, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE
Introduction
Predictions as to the economic future of a city and its
tributary region are basic to planning for that city and
region. Future population in an area and that population's
needs and demands will depend largely on the future economic
activity of that area.
Without good estimates of future population and industry
it is impossible to design effectively and plan economically.
Land use schemes, transportation systems, housing programs,
and most of the other things for which the planner is
responsible are dependent either on population, the economic
base which supports that population, or both.
The planner, therefore, must necessarily concern himself
with the economic future of the city or region for which he
is responsible if his plans are to be valid and useful.
Especially be must know if major economic shifts are likely
to affect his area.
Such shifts have been anticipated for the areas served
by the soon-to-be-built St. Lawrence Seaway. This project,
which has been vigorously supported and opposed by opposing
U
interest groups for the last half-century, is now a fait
accompli. Passage of the St. Lawrence Seaway bill this spring
z-
by the American Congress assures that the United States
and Canada will cooperate in the building of this gigantic
project.
Reference to the map of the Seaway (see 1AP I, Appendix)
shows that it will open up the Midwest areas of the United
States and Canada to the sea. Instead of just small,
inefficient vessels, full-size oceangoing ships and huge
barge-like lakes carriers will be able to ply the waterway
all the way from the Atlantic to the western tip of Lake
Superior. The industrial and agricultural Midwest will
thereby be able to trade via an economical all-water route
with foreign countries and to tap new sources of raw materials.
From the planner's standpoint, then, it is important
to determine what the impact of this new transport route
will be, both on the areas served by it and on those whose
economic activities depend to a substantial degree on the
areas served by it.
Purpose
The purpose of this report, therefore, is to determine
what effects the Seaway will have on the location of economic
activity in order to be able to make predictions as to the
economic future of the cities and regions affected by the
Seaway.
3Scope
To accomplish this purpose, the writer chose to analyse
the effects of the Seaway on the transportation of three
major commodities; iron ore, coal, and wheat, and of general
cargo. These four categories were chosen because it was
felt at the outset that they would account for the great
bulk of Seaway traffic and because changes in the transport
of these commodities and general cargo would have the most
significant effects on the future location of economic
activity.
Since iron ore and coal are the two materials basic
to the making of iron and steel, the analyses for them
were combined in a study of the iron and steel industry
in CHAPTER I. CHAPTER II analyses the movement of export
wheat. CHAPTER III presents a further study of coal shipments
for purposes other than the manufacture of iron and steel.
CHAPTER IV analyses trends in the transport of general cargo.
The conclusions reached in each analysis are then
summarized in the SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS.
'1
CHAPTER I: EFFECTS ON LOCATION IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
Scope of Analysis
Iron and steel is basically a transport-oriented
industry. Although labor, capital, power and other costs
are important, they do not very significantly from region
to region. On the other hand, the major costs of trans-
porting raw materials to the production point and finished
products to the market vary widely between regions and
are the determining factors in economic location of this
industry.
The four basic raw materials used in the production
of iron and steel are iron ore, coal, limestone, and
scrap. Limestone was not included in this analysis because
of its relatively ubiquitous nature and because of the
small quantity used relative to the other materials.
Scrap was also excluded because its availability and price
in any given region is subject to such rapid fluctuation.
'Raw Materil Transport Costs
Transport costs were therefore computed only for iron
1/ Isard and Cumberland, "New England as a Possible
Location for an Integrated Iron and Steel Works,"
Economic Geography, Vol. 26, No. 4, October 1950, pp 245-7.
ore and coal. Ore transport costs were computed from three
alternative sources: Labrador (TABLE I), Venezuela (TABLE 2),
and Lake Superior (TABLE 3). Coal transport costs were
computed only from the Pennsylvania-West Virginia area (TABLE 4)
as this is only real competitive source of good coking coal
available to the production points chosen.
In each ease transport costs were computed to existing
and potential production points via traditional routes and
via the Seaway. In all eases involving Seaway transport
figures were computed for both 15,000-ton and 20,000-ton
lakes-type vessels. This was done to take account .of possible
economies of scale involved in the larger bulk cargo shipments.
Although most vessels of this type are presently of the 15,000-
ton class, thee are ships now being built for lake service
of 20,000-ton capacity. These vessels will eventually replace
the smaller units since they will be better able to take
advantage of the 27-foot depth of the proposed Seaway. Since
both sizes will probably be in use for the next few years, both
sets of figures were included in the tables.
The costs of assembling the necessary eool and iron ore
to produce a gross ton of steel (TABLE 5) was computed for
all production points and ore sources. This summary table
emphasizes the differences in transport costs to each
production point as between the various sources. Since
institutional pricing practices might tend to reduce or
eliminate differences caused by inequalities in the quantities
of the various ores used, a second table (TABLE 6) was con-
structed. In this table identical quantities of ore and coal
per gross ton steel were used in the calculations no matter
what the ore source or quality was.
Foreign vs. Lake Superior Ores
The question of the foreign ores from Venezuela and
Labrador needs some further elaboration. Venezuela ores are
already being employed at Trenton and Baltimore. Labrador
ores are not yet in use but are being developed by American
companies for use at American production points to supplement
the dwindling stock of Lake Superior ores. Much of the argument
in this country in favor of helping Canada build the Seaway
has been based on the assumption that Labrador Ores would have
to be made cheaply available to American steel producers if
the economy of the midwest were not to suffer from lack of
this vital raw material.
Testimony before congressional committees has indicated
that the available reserves of high-grade, open-pit ores in
the Lake Superior area amounted to 1.6 billion gross tons in
2/
1951. With a 1951 consumption of 80 million gross tons a year,
2/ Earl M. Richards, Vice-President of the Republic Steel
Corp., test. before Sen. Sub. on For. Relations, 83rd Cong,
let Sess, p.125.
reserves were then calculated to be sufficient for 20 years.
Although there are reserves of 5 billion tons of taconite
ore, this ore is extremely low grade and must be processed
before it can be used in blast furnaces. This will add
substantially to its cost.
Estimated production of taconite concentrates for 1954
3/
is 2.5 million gross tons. This clearly will not go far
toward solving the iron ore shortage unless substantially
more investment is made in Taconite benefication plants.
Even if the proposed 1960 production of 13.5 million tons is
achieved, foreign ores will still be needed to help make up
the deficit unless American steel capacity fails to continue
4/
its present rate of increase.
Forecasts for the Labrador ore development anticipate
production of 10 million gross tons annually by 1956 and
5/
20 million by 1965. Venezualan production is expected to
6/
reach 15-20 million gross tons by the late 1960's. It is
apparent that both of these foreign sources will be needed
to supply expanded steel capacity at new production points
and eventually to replace Lake Superior ores at some existing
3/ Oscar I. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior, testimony
before the House Committee on Public Works, 82nd Cong.,
1st Sess, p.103.
4/ Oscar I. Chapman, testimonyloc. cit.
5/ Earl M. Richards, testimony, op. cit., p. 129.
6/ Oscar I. Chapman, testimony, op. cit., p. 114.
points. For this reason, rates on Venezuela and Labrador
ores were computed to all points even if these ores might
not be employed at these points for several years to come.
Actually, foreign ores may be able to compete with
Lake Superior ores at interior American production points
some little time before the Lake Superior ores give out.
The extra costs of going deeper to mine depleted ores, the
higher prices of benificiated taconite ores, and the
uncertainty of supply may all combine causing a shift towards
Labrador and Venezuela ores. It is unlikely, however, that
this will occur to any large extent within the next ten
years. For this reason, Lake Superior ores were used in the
calculations of TABLE 7 for all points presently using them
except Toronto which is expected to shift to Labrador Ore
when the Seaway is completed. (For further discussion of the
choice of Labrador Ore for Toronto, see the notes on Ore
Source at the end of IABIA 7).
Finished Product Transport Costs
Transport costs on finished products were computed to
each major steel market fv#m all production points which
might conceivably serve that market. Rail rates only were
used because finished steel seldom moves by water due to the
relatively small shipments of any particular steel product
and the high handling costs involved. These figures were
included in TABLE 7 rather than presented separately because
they were directly involved in the total cost computations' of
that table.
Total Transport Costs
Costs of transporting finished steel to each market
from its potential points were added to the costs of assembling
ore and coal at those production points to give the total
transport costs on finished steel at the market (TABLE 7).
These total transport cost figures present a picture of
market configuration if we assume that the production point
which involves the lowest total transport cost in delivering
finished steel to a market will be the supplier of that
market. This will be true as long as we ignore basing point
pricing systems and other institutional practices in the
iron and steel industry.
Basically, then, TABLE 7 gives an indication of a
reasonable market pattern on the basis of transport cost
differentials. Possible deviations from this pattern and
the reasons for these deviations lie beyond the scope of
this study.
Market Analysis
Analysis of the market pattern indicated by TABLE 7
-1-0
shows that the southern New England market falls entirely
to Trenton. Providence-Fall River, Hartford, and New Haven
are all Trenton's by a fair margin. Worcester and Boston,
while also within Trenton's market, show some competition
from Montreal and indicate that Montreal might be truly
competitive in notthern New England if there were no import
7/
duties involved.
Similarly, New York City is definitely in Trenton's
market, but Albany-Troy falls to Trenton by only a small
margin under Montreal and Buffalo. This indicates that
Montreal might, import duties aside, have the market north
of here while Buffalo should have it west of here. An
expected, then, we find Buffalo in possession of the western
New York State market including Binghamton, Utica, Syracuse,
%ochester, and Buffalo. Note that at all these points
Toronto is at a decided disadvantage even without import
duties. It should be pointed out, however, that Toronto's
disadvantage is increased by our choice of Labrador Ore for
this production point. Nevertheless, Toronto would still
be at a disadvantage with respect to Buffalo even if both
7/ American import duties on finished steel shapes averaged
10% of value in 1950. This rate would be actually more
than high enough to keep Montreal from competing at all in
American markets. Ref. United States Import Duties 1950,
U.S. Tariff Commission, .. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1950.
rpoints used Lake Superior Ore.
Continuing west we find that Cleveland has its own market
as expected. Toledo, Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and
Lansing fall to Detroit. Chicago has Chicago. Note that
Pittsburgh loses out in all markets except, of course, its
own. Although the historic location of steel industry at
Pittsburgh, with its proximity to the coal fields, was
logical when large quantities of coal were used per ton of
steel, the reduced quantities of coal presently required
together with the high cost of transporting ore to this point
have seriously damaged Pittsburgh's competitive position in
8/
other markets.
To the north, Montreal and Toronto are closely competitive
in the Winnipeg and Nakina markets. Although Detroit and
Chicago have cost advantages at these points, heavy import
duties would protect the Canadian steel industry from outside
9/
competition. Quebec has a major advantage in its own market
but, like 7 islands and Kingston (see notes at the end of
8/ For further elaboration on Pittsburgh's competitive position
as a steel producer see Isard and Capron "The Future
Locational Pattern of Iron and Steel Production in the
United States," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII,
No. 2, April 1949, p. 124.
9/ Canadian Import duties on finished steel shapes averaged
10% of value in 1938. There is no reason to believe that
this tariff has been reduced. Ref. Handbook of Canadian
Customs Tariff and Excise Duties, 48th dition, McMullin
Publishers Ltd., Montreal, 1938.-
TABLE 7has an insufficient local market to warrant an
integrated works. Montreal, then, will have the Quebec
Market as well as its own and Ottawa's markets. Toronto
has Torontod
Apparently no major shifts will take place in the
American market picture due to the Seaway. Trenton
neither gains nor loses advantage, except perhaps in
northern New England and New York where Montreal competition
is a potential factor only if import duties are ignored.
Buffalo suffers no major losses within the United States
but here, and at lake points to the west, losses of
Canadian market for American steel will occur if Montreal
goes into major production. Otherwise, the lake points of
Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago feel no major changes due
to the Seaway. This situation will continue, however, only
as long as sufficient reserves of Lake Superior ores remain.
The necessity for using foreign ores in future may make the
Seaway vital to the survival of interior American production
points.
On the Canadian side, Toronto, presently the only major
steel producer, will lose its Montreal, Quebec, and Ottawa
markets if Montreal goes into major steel production. This
loss would probably be compensated for by increased future
consumption in the areas tributary to Toronto in which that
point has major transport cost advantages and in reduction
of imports of American steel.
Montreal, then, qualifies the only potential point of
major change. Here transport co3t advantages, especially in
the transport of coal, will be made possible by the
construction of the Seaway. For the first time Montreal
will be in a position sufficiently competitive to warrant
10/
major steel production. The question remains whether the
Montreal market will be large enough to absorb the output
of a minimum efficient integrated iron and steel works.
Montreal Market Analsis
To answer this question, TABLE 8 has been constructed
giving the most recent available estimates of steel con-
sumption in the Montreal Market. For the purposes of this
table the Montreal Market was defined as the whole province
of Quebec plus the metropolitan area of Ottawa in the Province
of Ontario since a more complete breakdown of figures was not
available. The inaccuracies inherent in this assumption
should not be large since by far the major portion of steel-.
consuming industries in the Province of Quebec are located
in the metropolitan areas of Montreal and Quebec. Furthermore,
10/ See CHART 2 for comparison of present ore and coal
assembly costs at Montreal with future costs after the
Seaway has been completed.
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use of figures for only Ottawa in Ontario assumes that the
rest of the Ontario market falls to Toronto, when actually
the northeastern portion of the province would probably fall
to Montreal. The inaccuracies, then, would tend toward
underestimation of the true situation.
Referring to TABLE 8, at the bottom of column 5, we
find a total steel consumption of about 1.4 million tons.
11/
By American standards, and certainly by Canadian standards,
this is enough to warrant an integrated works. There is some
question however, whether the consumption of the various
finished steel shapes is sufficient to justify the construction
of efficient, sized finishing mille to produce them. To
answer this question we refer to the totals at the bottom
of columns 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15.
The total at the bottom of column 7 shows that the 1951
consumption of bars in the Montreal Market was 197,000 tons.
The minimum economic bar mill by U.S. standards would produce
270,000 tons per year. If we assume for the moment that in
a less industrialized country such as Canada U.S. standards
might not apply, we shall have to determine some sort of
Canadian standard for efficient size. In Canada in 1951 there
11/ See Isard and Cumberland, op. cit., for minimum efficient
standards of size for American mills.
was a bar and rod mill of 232,000 tons capacity, a second of
12/
172,000 tons capacity and a third of 152,000 tons capacity.
These data suggest that, by Canadian standards, a Montreal
bar mill would be justified.
Similarly, a reference to the total of column 9 shows
a Montreal market consumption of 315,000 tons of sheet and
strip, far short of the American minimum standard of 600,000
tons. We find for Canada in 1951, however, a combined sheet
and strip mill for cold-reduced black plate and tin plate of
489,000 tons. If we allow for significant future consumption
growth in the Montreal area and adjust the 489,000 ton figure
downwards to exclude cold-rolled products and other items
which are not usually included in sheet and strip mill size
calculations, a sheet and strip mill in the Montreal area
might become economically feasible.
The total at the bottom of column 11 shows that 276,000
tons of structural shapes were consumed in the Montreal
Market in 1951. The American standard for a minimum efficient
structural mill is 300,000 tons capacity. The largest
structural shape mill in Canada in 1951 was 154,000 tons
capacity. We therefore conclude that a structural shape mill
12/ See Directory of Iron and Steel Works of U.S. and
Canada 1951, American Iron and Steel Institute, for
Uanadi'anmill sizes and espacities.
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in the Montreal Area is feasible.
The total at the bottom of column 13 indicates that
242,000 tons of plate were consumed in the Montreal Market
in 1951. By American standards an efficient plate mill has
an annual capacity of at least 250,000 tons. In 1951, the
largest plate mill in Canada had a capacity of 150,000 tons.
We conclude that a Montreal plate mill is justified.
The 1951 wire rod consumption in the Montreal Market
shown at the bottom of column 15 was so small that a wire
rod mill in the Montreal area does not seem warranted.
In total, then, we would definitely anticipate for
Montreal a bar mill of about 200,000 tons, a structural
shape mill of about 275,000 tons and a plate mill of about
250,000 tons; 725,000 tons in all. If we were to allow for
the host of other products (except sheet and strip) produced
by a modern steel works, the capacity of a Montreal plant
would fall between the 756,000 ton capacity of the Algoma
Works and the 1.186,000 ton capauity of the Hamilton works
of the Steel Company of Canada, Ltd.
On this basis, we could conclude that an integrated
works without sheet and strip capacity would be feasible
at Montreal. If we should accept our own justification of
a sheet and strip mill, the basis for an integrated iron
V7
and steel works at Montreal would be well established.
Bear in mind, however, that institutional factors and
decisions within the Canadian steel industry may work to
retard or prevent steel development at Montreal. Certainly
Montreal is an attractive location, not only because of the
advantages cited, but also because it is presently a scrap
surplus point making scrap cheap and reducing the costs of
production even more relative to present production points
where scrap is in short supply. Still the Canadian industry
might, for its own reasons, choose to locate new or expanded
steel development at some other point.
Canadian consumption and Production
Certainly the need for expansion exists. TABLE 9 with
CHART I which accompanies it show that Canadian steel
production, though it has steadily increased, has not kept
pace with increasing Canadian consumption. Therefore,
imports have also been increasing to the point where they
have averaged l million tons annually over the last three
years. New production at Montreal or elsewhere in Canada,
then, would not be competitive with present production but
would merely serve to equalize Canadian consumption and
production while tending to eliminate imports. Leaders in
an industrialized nation often, right or wrong, place a
18
high value on steel self-sufficiency.
Conclusions
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that there will be
an increase of 11 to li million tons in Canada's steel capacity
within the next few years. Transport cost advantages involved
in the use of the Seaway make it both feasible and logical for
this increase to take place in the Montreal area. If economic
forces are allowed to operate unhampered by political, govern-
mental, or other institutional influences, there are good
grounds for expecting an integrated iron and steel works at
Montreal in the not too distant future.
TABLE I ---. TRANSPORT COSTS OF LABRADOR ORE PER GROSS TON ORE
PRODUCTION POINT CHIC DETR CLEV PITT BUFF TORO KING MONT QU 7ISL TREN BALT
Rail to 7 Islands
Transshipment
Toll on Seaway
(a) 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65
(b) .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
(c) .71 .71 .71 .71 .71 .36# .36#
15K-Ton carrier (d) 3.40 2.24 2.04 4.26*1.70 1.60 1.30 .96 .75 1.20 1.20
Total transport costs 7.09 5.93 5.73 7.95 5.39 4.94 4.64 3.94 3.73 2.65 4.18 4.18
s m mmmmmmmmmmmmmm- M a*mmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmo
(f)
20K-Ton carrier (e) 2.55 1.68 1.53 3.78*1.27 1.20 .97 .72 .60
Total transport costs 6.34 5.37 5.22 7.47 4.96 4.54 4.31 3.70 3.46
(a) From a table prepared by the Bureau of Mines as an exhibit to the testimony of Oscar
I. Chapman, Secretary of Interior, op.cit., P. 563.
(b) Schweitert and Lyon, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway, Chicago Association of
Commerce and Indus try1951. P. 37.
(c) From a table presented as an exhibit to the testimony of 6enator John karshall butler
of Maryland before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 1st
Sess. P. 418. Based on 56/ per gross ton plus 15# per dead weight ton return.
(d) The rate for 15K-ton lakes-type ore carriers is assumed to be 204 per gross ton per
100 miles. This figure is based on the testimony of Earl M. hichards, op.cit., P. 129.
20
TABL4 I contd.
(e) The rate for 20K-ton lakes-type ore carriers is
assumed to be 15 per gross ton per 100 miles. See
note (b) above.
(f) The rate to Trenton and Baltimore is essentiallv
based on the reference in note (b) above. The rate
presented by Sobweitert and Lyon, however, is based
on the use of 24,000 ton capacity ocean going ore
ships, whereas the figure used in the present table
is based on the use of ships of 10,000 to 15,000-ton
capacity.
t Includes transshipmnnt end rail transport to Pittsburgh.
# A lower toll rate applies for roronto and Kingston
because transport to these points involves the use of
only a portion of the toll-supported Seaway facilities.
See also general notes on TABLES 1 - 4 at the end of
TAkLE 4.
TABLE 2 --- TRANSPORT COSTS OF VENEZUELA ORE PER GROSS TON ORE
PRODUCTION POINT CHIC DETR CLEV PITT BUFF TORO KING MONT QUEB 71SL TREN BALT
Rail-water to Trinidad (a) 1.35
Transshipment (b) .33
Ocean vessel to
Transshipment
Toll on Seaway
15K-Ton carrier
Total transport
Mont (c) 2.23
(d) .45
(e) .71
costs
1.35 1.35
.33 .33
2.23 2.23
.45 .45
.71 .71
we " - s
1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
.33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23
.45 .45 .45 .45
.71 .71 .36# .36#
an - -00 an -a n a
(f) 2.44 1.28 1.08 3.33* .74* .64 .34
7.51 6.35 6.15 8.40 5.81 5.36 5.06 3.91 3.91
1.35 1.35 1.35
.33 .33 .33
2.23
3.91
20K-Ton carrier (g) 1.83 .96 .81 3.07* .56 .48 .26
Total transport costs 6.90 6.03 5.88 8.14 5.63 5.20 4.98 3.91 3.91 3.91
Ocean vessel to Balt (h) 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56
Transshipment (1) .45 .45 .45 .45 .45
Rail to Prod. Point (j) 4.80 4.20 3.48 3.00 3.24
Total transport costs 8.49 7.89 7.17 6.69 6.93 3.24 3.24
(a) From a table presented
loc. c it.
(b) See note (a) above.
as an exhibit to the testimony of Senator John Marshall Butler,
"M
TABLE 2 .cont'd.
(c) From the testimony of Senator John Marshall Butler,
loc. cit. It was assumed that, in accordance with
rate structure practices, rates to Montreal, Quebec,
and 7 Islands would be identical.
(d) See note (a) above.
(e) See note (a) above.
(f) See note (d), TABLE 1.
(g) See note (e), TABLE 1.
(b) See note (a) above. It was assumed that, in accordance
with rate structure practices, rates to Baltimore and
Trenton would be identical.
(i) See note (a) above.
(j) The basic rate figures are from a table presented as an
exhibit to the testimony of Gregory S. Prince, Assistant
General Counsel, Association of American Railroads, before
the House Committee on Public Works, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess., P. 726.
The rate to Chicago had to be interpolated from the data
since it was not included in the table. All rates had
to be increased by 15% because of the increase in rail
freight rates since the original data was compiled in
1951.
* Includes transshipment and rail transport to Pittsburgh.
# See Note #, TABLE I.
See also general notes on TABLES I - 4 at the end of TABLE 4.
,Z
TABLE 3 --- TRANSPORT COSTS OF SUPERIOR ORE PER GROSS TON ORE
PRODUCTION POINT CHIC DETR CLEV PITT BUFF TORO KING
Rail to Duluth (a) 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
Transshipment (b) .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
Toll on Seaway (c) .36 .36
15 K-Ton carrier (d) 1.60 1.40 1.60 4.10* 1.94 2.04 2.34
Total Transport costs 2.96 2.76 2.96 5.46 3.30 3.40 3.70
20K-Ton carrier (e) 1.20 1.05 1.20 3.66* 1.45 1.53 1.75
Total transport costs 2.56 2.41 2.56 5.02 2.81 2.89 3.11
(a) From a table presented as an exhibit to the testimony of
Earl M. Richards, loo. cit.
(b) See note (b), TABLE I.
(c) See notes (c) and #, TABLE I.
(d) See note (d), TABLE I.
(e) See note (e), TABLE I.
* Includes transshipment and rail transport to Pittsburgh.
Note: Montreal, Quebec, Seven Islands, Trenton and Baltimore
have been ommitted from this table for two reasons:
They have not used any substantial quantities of Lake
Superior ores in the past and they are not likely to do
so in the future. For further explanation see the
section on Ore Source in the General Notes on TABLE 7
at the end ofTTE, '.
See also General Notes on TABLES 1 - 4 at the end of TABLE 4.
TABLE 4 --- TRANSPORT C(BTS OF PENNSYLVANIA.-WEST VIRGINIA COAL PER GROSS TON COAL
PRODUC-TION POINT mma CHIC DETR CLEV PITT BUFF TORO KING MONT QUEB 71SL TREN BALT
Rail to Ashtabula
Transshipment
Toll en Seaway
(a)
(b)
(a)
3.22 3.22
.33 .33
3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22
.33 .33 .33 .33 .33
.25# .25# .50 .50m m as 0110 -w No m m am qW m m Sa
l5KWeen carrier (d)
Total transport *sts
1.38 .20
4.91 3.75
.34 .90* .96*1.08 1.40 2.04
3.89 4.70 4.76 5.13 5.45 8.09
a* am m e e SM se e 00 0 a o o a o mm ao - mo o oo m am Im n o 01 10 4 4 -o O -d tm
20K-Ton carrier (e)
Total transport costs
1.02 .15
4.57 3.70
Sa o m a -a Os l am m e m a Ma m o 00 10 0 e m a m o M 40 - 0 *a 0 s m l e f a m
.26 .70* .74* .81 1.05 1.53
3.81 4.50 4.54 4.86 5.10 5.58
Rail direct to Proj
Pt
Total transport cos
(f) 5.00/4.32 3.76
ta 5.00,4.32 3.76
1.52 4.17 5.00$4
1.52 4.17 5.00$
5.03 4.50
5.03 4.50
(a) Based on figures presented in "An Economie Appraisal of the St. Lamence Seaway
Project", Industry Report.--Domestie Transportation, U.S. Department of Commerce,Bureau of Foreign and Vomestie Commerce, August-November 1947, p. 53. Coal was
assumed to originate at Indiana, Pennsylvania, approximate center of the westernPennsylvania coal fields.
The figures presented in the above had to be revised upwards because of the
freight rate increases which have occurred since 1947.
(b) Transshipment charges on coal at Ashtabula were assumed to be the same as on ore
at lake ports because of the similarities in the handling of the two sommodities.
See note (b) TABLE I.
A
3*22
.33
.50
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(e) From the testimony of Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce,
before the House Committee on Public Works, 82nd cong.,
1st seas., p. 7.
The figures presented by Mr. Sawyer were 25#-35# per ton
of soal plus 15# per deadweight ton return. The higher
figure was assumed because increased construction costs
would seem to make higher tolls necessary to amortize
the Seaway Project.
(d) Water shipment charges on coal in lakes-type vessels was
assumed to be the same as on ore because of the
similarities of the two commodities. See note (d),
TABLE I.
(e) See note (d) above and note (e), TABLE I.
(f) Interpolated from figures included in a table presented
as an exhibit to the testimony of Gregory S. Prince, op.
cit., P. 725. See also note (a) above.
Direct rail rates to these points are higher than the
figures shown. The actual values are not too important,
however, since coal would obviously go to these points
by the cheaper water transport anyway.
# See note #, TABLE I.
* Note that the transport costs to Toronto and Kingston
are higher than would be expected when compared to the
costs to Buffalo, Detroit, and Chicago. This is because
it has been assumed that low back-haul rates for ore
boats returning to Duluth would apply directly to
Detroit and indirectly to Buffalo and Chicago in
competition with Detroit. They do not apply to Toronto
or Kingston, however because these points are not
assumed to use Lake superior Ore nor are they in direct
competition with American points with respect to this
commodity. The reader may wish to make a different
assumption but, in any case, the basic conclusions of
this report will not be changed.
General Notes on TABLES 1 - 4
Institutional pricing practices are likely to equalize
prices between adjacent points. Generally, howeve, it
it impossible to know what the equalization point or
26
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price will be. Therefore, figures for these tables
were computed, except where noted, on the basis of
actual transport costs ignoring all institutional
considerations such as import duties, price
equalization, etc.
Cost figures for certain points were ommitted where
it was obvious that a particular mode of transportation
could not possibly eanpete with other transport media
or routes to those points.
TABLE 5 ---- ORE AND COAL TRANSPORT COSTS PER GROSS TON STEEL
CPUTED-FOR ORE AND CML MUATITIS REMUIRED
BY TYPE OF ORE USED
PRODUCTION POINT CHIC DETR CLEV PITT BUFF TORO KING MONT QUEB 7ISL TREN BALT
Labrador Ore via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Venezuela Ore via
15K-Ton earrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail via Baltimore
Superior Ore via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
"- w w w"s m e* s - s
(a)
9.64
8*72
an ms am wusWuM u
8.06
7030
as 40 m
7079
7.10
40 m A*
10.82*
10.17*
7033
6.75
6.72
6*17
6*30
5*86
5.36
5.03
so so uso
5.69# 5.69#
4m a* ows 0 to a
(b)
9.24
8049
10.45
us~ so 06S
7.81
7042
9.71
*a so No
7*56
7024
8082
opso -
7.14
6093
8.23 8.52
fm m m s o - m
6.59
6.40
6022
6.13
4.81# 4.81# 4.81# 3.99# 3.99#
(a)
4020
3063
-~~0 ms sm-
3.92
3.42
4.20
3.63
es so go
7.75*
7.12*
4.68
3099
4083
4.10
5.25
4042
- " go
Coal (L) via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail direct to ProdOf a" -4w s " 0 m -w -
Pt
me m
6028
5.85
6.40
4.80
3097
5.53
IN so a
4.81 1.95
w us m #m u s o s
4.98
4.88
5.33
6.02
5.76
6.09 6.57 6.98 7.80
5.81 6.22 6.53 7.15
6.44 5.76
- ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ s a m vw usu su u s u - - u u su
Coal (Y) via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail direct to Prod
(e)
Pt
us usa usM usn us u I s" usb us M s4W W us u
Coal (5) via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail direct to Prod
4w us No am us us mus Rus a us
5.90
5.42
6.00$
to us "
4.50
3.72
5.18 4.52 1.82
so us ous "a s us mu
4.67
4.57
5000
(f)
Pt
AI u4Dsou
6048
6.03
6.60$
ms us u s
4.95
4.09
5.70
s s us
4.97 2.01
so us vo wu s 
5.13
5003
5050
5.64
5040
6*20
5.94
5.76 6.16 6.54 7.31
5.45 5.83 6.12 6.70
ON s u - s u s u
6.28 6.
6.00 6.r
us us u us us
6.O4 5.40
m an u mus s gu
78 7.19 8.04
52 6.73 7.37
6.65 5.94
us~~o us"ss uMs
4o*875.0?am
3.60
3.60
(dl)
M M 4-0 ow -f - us - s em ow us 0 4Ms w e*- owSoso m
so w do m go M - so- ow so s -M w u w w s
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(a) Basic figures from TABLE I multiplied by 1.36 gross tons
ore per gross ton steel.
(b) Basic figures from Table 2 multiplied by 1.23 gross tons
ore per gross ton steel.
(a)BBasic figures from TABLE 3 multiplied by 1.42 gross tons
ore per gross ton steel.
(d) Basic figures from TABLE 4 multiplied by 1.28 gross tons
coal per gross ton steel made from Labrador ore.
(e) Basic figures from TABLE 4 multiplied by 1.20 gross tons
coal per gross ton steel made from Venezuela ore.
(f) Basie figures from TABLE 4 multiplied by 1.32 gross tons
coal per gross ton steel made from Superior ore.
/ ee note , TABLE 4.
* See note *, TABLE 1.
# Via ocean-going vessel of 10,000 to 15,000 tons capacity.
Note: The quantities of ore and coal needed to produce a ton
of steel depend on the iron content of the ore used.
Ores from Labrador, Venezuela, and Superior vary in iron
content. Hence, different quantities of ore, and the
coal to be used with that ore, were employed in computing
this table according to the ore source. ource for
these quantities was Isard and Cumberland "New England
as a Possible Location for an Integrated Iron and Steel
Works," Economic Gleography, October, 1950, P. 248.
TABLE6 --- ORE AND COAL TRANSPORT COSTS PER GROSS TON STEEL
COMPUTED FOR EQUAL QUAk NTITIS --OF ORE AND COAL
IRR3SECTIVE OF TYPE OF ORE-USED
PRODUCTION POINT_ CHIC DETR OLEV PITT -BUFF TORO KING MONT QUEB 7ISL TREN BALT
Labrador Ore via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
(a)
9.64 8.06 7.79 10.82* 7.33
8.72 7.30 7.10 10.17* 6.75
m 0 . o m ow m a- me 40 - 4 do so m if " " 4 - o 4 40 m 4w m an n a
6.72 6.30 5.36 5.07 3.60
6.17 5.86 5.03 4.87 3.60
5.69# 5.69#
40 - - m-
Venezuela Ore via
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail via Baltimore
(b)
10.21
9*38
11.55
8.64
8*20
10.73'
8.36
8.00
9.75
11.42*
11*08*
9.09
7*90
7066
9.43
7.29 6.88
7.07 6.77
5.32# 5.32# 5.32# 4.41# 4.41#
Superior Ore via (c)
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
4.03 3.75 4.03 7.43* 4.49
3.48 3.28 3.48 6.83* 3.82
M V M w e* -m w M m m w osso m w m m m ma w m o mm-w- 4m
coal via
4.62 5.03
3.93 4.23
fm m so- m- 4w o " m w m mm4w m m m s
(d)
15K-Ton carrier
20K-Ton carrier
Rail direct to Prod Pt
6*28
5.84
6.40$
4.80
3.97
5053
4.98
4*88
5.33
40 s - - -
6.02 6.10 6.57 6.98 7.80
5.76 5.81 6.22 6.53 7.15
6.44 5.76
so -OsOgo --------------------- n
(a) Basic figures from TABLE I multiplied
ore per gross ton steel.
(b) Basic figures from TABLE 2 multiplied
ore per gross ton steel.
(e) Basic figures from TABLE 3 multiplied
ore per gross ton steel.
(d) Basic figures from TABLE 4 multiplied
coal per gross ton steel.
See note /, TABLE 4.
* See note *, TABLE I.
by 1.36 gross tons
by 1.36 gross tons
by 1.36 gross tons
by 1.28 gross tons
# See note #, TABLE 5.
TABLE 7 -- TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON ORE AND COAL AND ON
FINISHED PRODUCTS PH GROSS TON STEEL FOR
PRUCTION POINTS SERVING MARKETS INDICATED
PRODUCTION POINT ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON TOTAL
AND I MARKET SOURCE ORE COAL PRODS.* COSTS
BOSTON MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 10.60 20.63
Pittsburgh a 7.12 2.01 18.02 27.15
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 13.78 22.80
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 11.39 22.64
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 12.47 23.87
PROVIDENCE-FALL RIVER MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 9 28 19.31
Pittsburgh 7.12 2.01 15.63 24.76
Buffalo 3.99 5.03 15.38 24.40
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 11.97 24.22
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 13.52 24.92
WORCESTER MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 9.81 19.84
Pittsburgh 8 7.12 2.01 17.24 24.37
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 13.25 22.27
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 9.81 21.06
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 15.38 26.78
HARTFORD MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 8.22 18.25
Pittsburgh 8 7.12 2.01 15.63 24.76
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 12.72 21.74
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 9.81 21.06
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 15.38 26.78
TABLE 7 cont'd.
PRODUCTION POINT
AND MARKET
ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON
&OURCE ORE COAL PRODS.
NEW HAVEN MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 6.36 16.39
Pittsburgh 3 7.i2 2.01 16.42 25.55
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 12.72 21.74
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 11.55 22.80
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 15.11 26.51
NEW YORK MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 4.51 14.54
Pittsburgh S 7.12 2.01 13.25 22.38
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 12.19 21.21
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 11.70 22.95
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 15.40 26.80
ALBANYmoTROY MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 8.22 18.25
Buffalo S -399 5.03 10.08 19.10
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 8.22 19.47
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 10.60 22.00
Toronto L 6.17 5.29 12.00 23.46
BINGHAMTON MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 10.33 20.36
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 7.95 16.97
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 10.33 21.58
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 12.19 23.59
Toronto L 6.17 5.29 9.25 20.71
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PRODUCTION POINT ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON
AhD MARKET SOURCE ORE ALSTS
UTICA MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 10.08 20.11
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 8.48 17.50
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 7.95 19.20
quebee L 4.87 6.53 10.60 22.00
Torent. L 6.17 5.29 9.75 21.21
SYRACUSE MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 9.94 19.97
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 6.89 15.91
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 8.75 20.00
Quebee L 4.87 6.53 11.12 22.52
Toronto L 6.17 5.29 8.75 20.21
ROCHESTER MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 10.88 20.91
Pittsburgh S 7.12 2.01
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 4.24 13.26
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 10.08 21.33
4 uebec L 4.87 6.53 11.92 23.32
oronto L 6.17 5.29 5.50 16.96
BUFFALO MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 12.19 22.22
Pittsburgh S 7.12 2.01 8.08 17.21Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 9.02
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 10.88 22.13Toronto L 6.17 5.29 4.25 15.71
Cleveland S 3.63 4.97 7.16 15.76
TOTAL
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PRODUCTION POINT
AND MARKET
CIEVELAND MARKET
Trenton
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Detroit
Baltimore
Toronto
Cleveland
TOLEDO MARKET
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Detroit
Baltimore
Toronto
Cleveland
Chicago
ORE
SOURCE
V
S
S
S
V
L
3
S
V
L
S
S
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON
ORE COAL
3*99
3.99
7* 12
3.42
3*99
6*17
3.63
3.99
7.12
3.42
3.99
6*17
3.63
3*63
6.*04
5.03
2.01
4.* 09
5* 40
5.76
4.97
5.03
2*01
4.09
5.40
5.76
4* 97
6*03
14.83
7.16
5.83
6.63
13.25
10.33
9.15
8.08
3.44
14.83
8.75
5.30
8.08
DETROIT MARKET
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 8.08 17.10
Pittsburgh 3 7.12 2.01 8.48 17.61
Detroit a 3.42 4.09 7.51
Toronto L 6.17 5.76 9.75 19.88
Cleveland 8 3.63 4.97 6.63 15.23
Chicago 3 3.63 6.03 8.75 18.41
FLINT MARKET
Buffalo 3 3.99 5.03 8.48 17.50
Detroit 3 3.42 4.09 3.58 11.09
Toronto L 6.17 5.29
Cleveland S 3.63 4.97 6.63 15.23
Chicago 5 3.63 6.03 8.75 18.41
73$'
TOTAL
COSTS
24.86
16.18
14.96
14.14
22.64
22.26
8*60
18.17
17.21
10.95
24.22
20.68
13.90
17*74
PRODS.
SOURCE
TABLE 7 cont'd.
PRODUCTION POINT ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON TOTAL
AND MARKET SOURCE ORE COAL PRODS. COSTS
GRAND RAPIDS MARKET
Buffalo 8 3.99 5.03 11.12 20.14
Detroit 5 3.42 4.09 6.36 13.87
Toronto L 6.17 5.76 9.94 21.87
Cleveland 8 3.63 4.97 9.02 17.62
Chicago 8 3.63 6.03 7.42 17.08
LANSING MARKET
Buffalo 5 3.99 5.03 9.81 18.83
Detroit 8 3.42 4.09 4.51 12.02
Cleveland 8 3.63 4.97 7.82 16.42
Chicago 8 3.63 6.03 7.42 17.08
CHICAGO MARKET
Detroit S 3.42 4.09 8.75 16.26
Chicago a 3.63 6.03 9.66
WINNIPEG MARKET
Buffalo 5 3.99 5.03
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 25.70 36.95
Quebee L 4.87 6.53 24.91 36.31
Toronto L 6.17 5.76 23.58 35.51
Detroit 5 3.42 4.09 25.71 33.22
Ghisage S 3.63 6.03 22.00 31.66
TABLE 7 cont'd.
PRODUCTION POINT ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON TOTAL
AND MARKET SOURCE ORE COAL P COSTS
NAKINA MARKET
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 22.52 33.77
Quebee L 4.87 6.53 22.00 33.40
Toftnto L 6.17 5.76 20.93 32.86
Detroit 8 3.42 4.09 22.79 30.30
Chioago a 3.63 6.03 23.58 33.24
QUEBEC MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 14.58 24.61
Buffalo S 3.99 5.03 15.50 24.52
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 6.89 17.14% uebee L 4.87 6.53 11.40
oronto L 6.17 5.76 14.83 26.76
MONTREAL MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 10.88 20.91
Buffalo a 3.99 5.03 13.66 22.68
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 11.25
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 6.76 18.17
Toronto L 6.17 5.76 11.39 23.32
OTTAWA MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 13.52 23.55
Buffalo a 3.99 5.03 15.11 24.27
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 5.30 16.55
Quebec L 4.87 6.53 8.75 20.15
Toronto L 6.17 5.76 8.22 20.15
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PRODUCTION POINT ORE TRANSPORTATION COSTS ON TOTAL
AND MARKET SOURCE ORE COAL PRODS. OSTS
TORONTO MARKET
Trenton V 3.99 6.04 12.50 22.53
Buffalo a 3.99 5.03 4 25 13.27
Montreal L 5.03 6.22 9.54 20.79
$ uebea L 4.87 6.53 11.67 23.O07
oronte L 6.17 5.76 11.93
Note: V - Venezuela Ore
L - Labrador Ore
S - Lake Superior Ore
GENERAL NOTES
Production Point
Oosts were computed only for those points which might
reasonably be expected to serve the given market. Some were
included because they were past suppliers of the market;
others were added because they are potential future suppliers
of that market. Points were omitted if their cost totals
were so high that they could not possibly compete in the
marke te
Note that 8even Island a d Kingston were ommitted
completely from this table. %is was for two reasons: first,
in almost every ease these two points had transport cost
disadvantages in comparison to nearby competing points and
second, their local markets were assumed to be too small to
allow them to become major production points in the foreseeable
future.
Market
The markets included had to fulfill two criteria: first,
they had to be major industrial centers and second, they
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had to be past or future consumers of steel produced at the
points selected for cost analysis in TABLES 1 - 6.
Note that not all markets which fulfill these criteria
have been included. Limitations of space and time allowed
the inclusion of only those markets where significant
changes in steel supply costs or sources might be expected,
or where it seemed desirable to demonstrate the market
orientation of steel location at production points them-
selves.
Ore Source
The ore source designated in each case was chosen on
the basis of past experience, institutional factors, and
disposition of available reserves. Thus Trenton and
Baltimore were assumed to continue using the Veneuela ore
for which they wgre intended. Chicago, etroit, leveland,
Pittsburgh, and uffalo were assumed to continue using
Lake superior ore as in the past, at least as long as
sufficient reserves remain. Montreal and Quebec were
assumed to begin using native Labrador ore, if and when
they begin producing steel in substantial quantities.
Tovonto is the only point about which there is some
question. Lake Superior ores have been employed here in
the past, but it would probably be the first point to lose
its supply of the ores when they'become scarce in the future.
Furthermore, it seemed likely that Toronto producers, with
their location in Canada, would rather rely on the sub-
stantial reserves of native Labrador ore than remain
dependent on an uncertain American supply. For these
reasons Labrador ore was designated for Toronto. See also
section on foreign vs. Lake Superior ores, P.
Ore Transportation Costs
These figures were taken directly from TABIE 5. The
cheapest mode of transportation was selected in every case.
We assumed that the more economical 20,000-ton ore carriers
would become generally available in the near future. Even
if they should not, the conclusions drawn from this table
would not be significantly changed since all points except
Trenton and Baltimore receive their ore via lakes-type ore
carriers. Hence the ore costs to all points except the two
above would be proportionately increased by the use of
15,000-ton carriers and market boundaries would not be
substantially changed.
Coal Transportation Costs
As above, these figures were taken directly from
TABLE 5. Again the cheapest mode of transportation was
chosen, based on the assumptions outlined above.
Finished Product Transportation Costs
These figures were based, where possible, on a table
included in a recent issue of The Iron Age.l/ The rates
in the table were given in cents per 100 lbs. These figures
were multiplied by 22.4 (final figures are for gross ton
steel) and again by 115% and 103% to take into account the
freight rate increase and federal tax respectively. The
formula for any rate would be:
(cents/100 lbs.) x (22.4) x (1,15) x (1.03) equals transport
cost.
No rates were given in the published table for
Canadian points. These rates were determined from a graph
drawn for this purpose. Actually two curves were drqwn:
one for rates from west to east and the other from east to
west since west to east rates are apt to be higher.
The curves were constructed by plotting rates vs.
distance. Distances were computed by use of the Commercial
Atlas and various railroad maps. Rates for known ints
were determined from the table in Iron Age. Rates for
Canadian points were then estimatedfrom the curves.
1/ "Iron and Steel Freight Rates," The Iron Age, January 7,
1954.
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TABLE .- u--CONSUMPTION OF STEEL IN THENPROVINCE OF Q EC
PLUS NTHOTAWAB I TROPOLAN T AREA INT HE TPROVINE
OF ONTAIO BY INDUSTRY AND TYPE OP FINISHED -STE
(1)
SECTION A EMPLOYEES
QUEB&OTTA
INDUSTRY (4)
Agri. Impl. 483
Boiler Shop 1052
Fabric. Strue. 3083
Hardware, Tools 2864
Heating Equip. 2469
Household Mach. 4605
Machine Shop 2714
Machine Tools 160
Machinery 7693
Prim. Iron & St. 3017
Sheet Metal 5452
Wire 1339
Bicycles 261
Boats & Ships 5687
Motor Veh. & Parts 1461
Railroad Equip. 17258
Heavy Ele. Mach. 1108
Radios and Parts 3675
Refrig. & Appliance 2851
Other Machinery 4074
Misco. Manufacture. 11033
SUBTOTAL A
(2)
EMPLOYEES
U.S.A.
THOUS.(U)
94.1
69.0
79.7
125.8
110.5
101.0
1545.3
70.7
1545.3
1167.1
174.7
5608
15*6
149.7
653.2
9101
281.6
178.6
17307
128.9
801.4
(3)
-(c )
.0051
.0153
.0388
.0228
.0224
.0419
.0002
.0002
.0005
.00026
.0312
.0235
.0017
.038
.0022
.1894
O 0039
.0206
.0164
.0316
.0138
(4)
TOTAL STEEL
CONSUMED U.S.
NET K-TONS
(d)
1278
2289
3875
1244
1119
361
6420
60
6420
3764
3276
912
114
654
6344
1786
1467
97
1040
2534
2149
(5)
TOTAL
q & 0
NET T
6520
35020
152000
28400
25080
15130
1284
12
3210
942
102200
21450
80200
1942
24850
13960
338000
5720
2000
17050
29700
1004670
(6)
BARS
U.S.A
NET T
.630
.. 066
.633
.479
.043
*036
10717
*031
1.717
.658
.091
.032
.611
*022
.037
.770
.206
* 173
.005
o033
o287
(7)
BARS
Q & 0
NET T(e)T
3220
1010
24550
4770
964
1509
343
6
858
165
2840
752
19330
374
1407
1695
39000
675
103
541
3960
107572
(8) (9)
S & S# s & S#
U.S.A q&O
INET T NET T_
(d)w
.391
.416
.472
.103
.967
.271
2.130
.004
3.130
o223
2.612
.067
.742
.077
. 072
4.626
.303
.634
.080
.930
10078
(e )
1995
6360
18300
2350
21670
11370
426
1
1065
56
81400
1575
23450
1310
2737
10180
57500
2472
1650
15270
14870
276007
S
N
2
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
WIRE
TRUTY STRUC PLATE PLATE ROD
.S.A Q & 0 U.S.A Q & 0 U.S.A
ET T NET T NET T NET T NET T
(d) (e)-~~ (d) (e)J .(d)
.064 327 .070 36 .015
.181 2770 1.492 22800 .006
.088 81100 .560 21720 .021
.005 114 .510
.003 67 .072 1613 .003
.493 99
.004 1
.493 246
.052 13
.007 219
.001 21
.102 3880
.009 20
.408 77400
.037 144
.005 82
.046 635
167024
.042
.977
.003
. 977
.170
.082
.001
.447
.145
O 575
.116
1760
195
1
489
43
2565
2
17000
319
109000
453
.067
.067
2.085
.024
.788
.001.
.048
.001
.164
(15)
WIRE
ROD
Q & 0
NET T
76
92
815
11630
67
13
34
522
748
18530
2
106
338
580
.016 273 .007 119
.161 2220 .170 2345
180603 36017
SECTION B CONSUMPTION TOTAL STEEL TOTAL
CAS %'OF NADA Q & Pjjp NET TqpSg CANADA NET K-TONS T
Building Oonstr. 25.4 (f) 620 157500
Railway Operating 24.6 (g) 553 136000
Mining & Lumber 22.0 (h) 216 47500
Pub. Works, Util- 31.0 (1) 122 37800
ities, Nat. Defense
SUBTOTAL B 378800
7IRE
BARS s & S# STRUC PLATE ROD
q & 0 Q & 0 Q & 0 Q & 0 Q & 0
NET T NET T NET T NET T NET T
26300 10100 40300 27400
43500 10800 62000" 19700
13300 3500 4750 10700
6600 10800 2200 3800
890 520109250m 61600
1383470 197272 311207 276274" 242203 36017TOTA L
~
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TABLE 8 cont'd.
(a) "Labor Force--. Occupations and Industries," Ninth
Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. IV, Department ofTrade
and~Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa,
1953.
(b) Census of !anufactures 1947, Department of Commerce,
bureau of the Census, sashington, 1950.
(c) The ratio of employees in Quebec plus Ottawa to the
employees in the United States in the same industry
is given in this column. The reason for making this
calculation will be found in note (e) below.
(d) "Consumption of Metal Mill Shapes and Forms and Castings
by Individual Manufacturing Industries: 1947," Census of
Manufactures, op. cit. In many cases, several manufactur-
Ing designaTions in the U.S. Census were added together
to approximate the designation in the Canadian Census.
(e) This figures were calculated by multiplying the quantities
in the (c) column by the appropriate figures in one of
the (d) columns. This method of calculating Canadian
consumption was based on the theory that the consumption
per employee in Canadian industry was the same as that in
American industry.
There are potential fallacies in this assumption. The
use of this method was not because it was necessarily
the best, but only because it was the only reasonable
method available. Unfortunately, the Canadian Census
figures are not as comprehensive as their American
equivalents. Nevertheless, the writer feels that where
this method may fail in accuracy, it succeeds in giving
a better overall picture of the consumption in the
Montreal Market than any other method presently available.
(f) Based on Value of Construction data, The Canada Yearbook,
1952-53, Department of Trade and Commerce, dominion
Bureau of Statistics.
(g) Roughly based on population data. Ibid.
(h) Roughly based on number of employees in mining, and value
of lumber production data,ibid.
(i) Based on population data, ibid.
TABLE 8 cont'd.
(j) Canadian Statistical Review, April, 1951, Department of
Trade Ed Uomime ree, DTnn Bureau of Statistics.
# Sheet and strip
" Includes rails
-- 0CANADIAN IRON AND STEEL
PRODUCTION DATA
C ONSUMPTION AND
PRODUCTION
NET K-TONS
1293
1878
2260
2592
2503
2513
2398
1939
2455
2667
2659
2820
2601
2616
2697
CONSUMPT ION
NET K-TONS
1478
2222
2670
3417
3168
2880
2731
2440
3101
3282
3480
3560
3937
3919
3717
EXPORTS
NET K-TONS
214
333
302
175
160
267
321
121
140
203
183
182
59
68
126
IMPORTS
NET K-TONS
399
677
712
100
825
634
654
622
786
818
1004
922
1395
1371
1146
Source: Canadian Statistical Review, Department of Trade
an u of Statistics,
Ottawa.
TABLE 9
YEAR
42
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
CHkRT 1
CANADIAN STEEl CONSUMPTION
YEAR
U)
0
C')
0
3 -
2 , . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . I . . . . . .
194C hi 42 43 h 45 46 47 48 h9 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
CHART 2
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF DELIVERING ORE AND COAL TO MONT
WZTTH AND WITHOUT THE SEAWAY
Costs per Gross Ton Ore and Coal
Without Seaway
$11.18
Costs on Sup-
erior Ore (a)
Costs on Penn
W.Va.Coal (b)
5.53
5.65
3.70
4.86
With Seaway
Costs on Lab-
rador Ore (c)
Costs on Penn
W.Va.Coal (d)
Costs Adjusted for Quantities of Ore and Coal Used (e)
Per Gross Ton of Steel Produced
915.20
Costs on Sup-
erior Ore
Costs on Penn
W.Va. Coal
7.75
7,45
$11.25
.03
6.22
Costs on Lab-
rador Ore
Costs on Penn
W.Va.Coal
(a) $3.70 rate to Kingston vlus 9.33 transshipment and S1.50 canaller rate.
(b) $3.22 rate to Ashtabula plus $.33 transshipment and $2.10 canaller rate.
(c) TABLE 1
(d) TABLE 4(e) Costs in upper half of chart multiplied by Ore and Coal quantities
per Gross Ton Steel as presented in TABLE 5.
Note: Canaller rates were interpolated from figures given in "An Appraisal
of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project," op. cit.
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CHAPTER It: EFFECTS ON WHEAT SHIPMENTS
Scope of Analysis
We will concern ourselves here only with the possible
effects of the Seaway on the transportation of wheat destined
for export. Although much of the wheat produced in the plain
states of the United States and Canada is consuned within
those two countries, the seaway will affect the shipment of
home-consumed wheat only to points directly served by the
seaway. American and Canadian Lake points, large wheat
consumers in themselves can already be served by large bulk-
type lake carriers. The Seaway will permit this service to
be extended to such points as Toronto and Montreal, but the
wheat consumption of these cities is small in comparison
with the large amount of North American wheat which moves to
the Atlantic coast destined for export. It is only this
latter wheat traffic, then, which we will consider in our
analysis.
Transport Routes of Export Wheat
It is important to understand the basic flows of export
wheat in order to determine the effects of the Seaway upon
them. Typically, wheat is shipped by rail from the plain
states to elevator storage at Duluth-Superior on the American
side or PortmArtbur-Fort William on the Canadian side of
Lake Superior. From these elevators it is loaded into bulk
carriers similar to those used for ore shipments.
These vessels traverse the lakes and are unloaded at
Buffalo on the American side or Port Colborne on the
Canadian side of Lake Erie. After elevation and reloading
the wheat travels by barge via the New York State Barge Canal
to New York or by rail to Portland, Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, or Baltimore. At these points it is again
1/
elevated and then loaded into ocean-going vessels for export.
Grain elevated at Port Colborne travels by barge via the
Welland Canal to Montreal or by rail to Montreal, Quebec,
6t. John, or Halifax. £hese latter two points, however,
are served mainly by rail shipments from Georgian Bay ports
west of Port Colborne during the winter season when the
navigation channels to Montreal and Quebec are closed by
ice. At all the above points the wheat is elevated before
2/
reloading into ocean-going ships.
It is important to note that by no means all of the
Canadian export wheat moves through Canadian ports. Actually,
in the period between 1936 and 1946, about 25% of the
1/ From the testimony of Walter J. Kelly, Vice-President in
charge of traffic, Association of American hailroads,
before the Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, op.
cit., p. 472-3.
2/ "An Bconomio Appraisal of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project,
op.ait., p. 27.
4r7
Canadian export wheat was shipped through American atlantic
3/
coast ports. There are several reasons for this: first, the
capacity of the St. Lawrence canal system and the Canadian
railroads is not sufficient to carry all the Canadian wheat
from Port Colborne and the Georgian bay ports to the Atlantic
ports; second, the elevator capacity of the Canadian lalce
ports is insufficient for peak-season handling of Canadian
wheat; third, shipment through Buffalo gives Canadian exporters
a wider choice of export point and means of transport to
4/
that point.
An increasing quantity of Canadian export wheat has
been going west through the port of Vanouver. This movement
reached a total of 64 million bushels in 1946 but it should
be noted that this was a peak year in postwar Canadian wheat
exportation when 343 million bushels were taxing the capacities
5/
of all ports. Under more stable conditions it would be
expected that wheat destined for Far Eastern points would
continue to flow through Vancouver despite transport
economies involved in the use of the Seaway.
Similarly, it would be expected that the flow of
3/ Ibid, p. 23.
4/ From the testimony of John L. McDougall, Professor of
Commerce, 4ueen's University, Ontario, before the House
Committee on Public Works, opbeit., p. 885.
5/ Canadian Statistical Review, epartment of Trade and
mrdruonioiiueau of 6tatistios, Ottawa, April,
1951.
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American export wheat south via rail and Mississippi barge
to the ports of Galveston and New Orleans would continue as
long as the wheat was destined for points to the south which
could be best served by these ports.
In this analysis, then, we will confine ourselves to
the movement of export wheat to Atlantic coast ports and
the effects of the Seaway on that movement. Even if wheat
were to be diverted from Pacific and Gulf Coast ports, we
would assume that it would follow the same trends as the
eastward-moving wheat which we are considering.
Transport Cost Analysis
TABLE I shows the cost of transporting a bushel of wheat
via various routes to various Atlantic ports. Reference to
this table indicates that New York was at a cost disadvantage
with respect to Baltimore and Philadelphia in 1951, and,
presumably, earlier than that. Yet in 1948, about 10 million
bushels of American wheat and 3.3 million bushels of
6/
Canadian wheat were exported through New York. This was
apparently due to the low cost of ocean transport from New
York. So many liners call at this port that many of them,
6/ From the testimony of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Member
of Congress from the State of New York, before hearings
by the Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit.,
P. 683.
r7/ 49
are willing to take on wheat at low ballast rates. Although
the exact figures are not available, it appears that savings
were and still are sufficient to offset New York's i$ a
bushel disadvantage.
Note that the water-rail rate to hew York via Buffalo
was the same as the all-water rate via Buffalo and the New
York State Barge Canal. Although it is a well-known fact
that water transport, even by inefficient barge-size units,
is ordinarily cheaper than rail transport over the same
distance, the railroads have managed to keep their rates
down in order to remain competitive with barge transportation.
It is unlikely, however, that the Canadian railroads,
whose rate per bushel on wheat moving via the Georgian Bay
ports was already 25 higher than the all-water rate via
Port Colborne to Montreal in 1951 can possibly lower their
rates enough to compete with the Seaway rate of 9j$ or 85.
By the same token, rail transport costs to St. John and
Halifax will doubtless remain substantially higher than
comparable Seaway rates and these points will remain
relegated to off-season wheat traffic. Montreal and
Quebec, then will share the major portion of the Canadian
7/ From the testimony of John L. McDougall, Professor of
Commerce, Queen's University, Ontario, before hearings
by the House Committee on Public Works, op. cit., p. 885.
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export trade with Montreal getting the majority because of
its proximity to the lower lake ports.
But if the Canadian rail transport is not competitive
with the Seaway, neither is any form of transport to
American Atlantic ports. Even without the Seaway, Montreal
had a cost advantage of 9W over Boston and New York and 9#
over Baltimore and Philadelphia in 1951. It would seem from
this that all the Canadian export wheat, at least, should
have moved through Montreal. As has been pointed out above,
however, this was not the case. The limited Canadian
elevator capacities and the bottlenecks in the St. Lawrence
canal system combined with New York's advantageous position
with respect to ocean rates and the route-choice advantages
of shipping via Buffalo and American ports tended to divert
Canadian wheat from the Canadian ports.
The construction of the Seaway, however, will relieve
the bottlenecks in the canal system and alleviate the need
for extra elevator capacity at the lower lake ports since
the bulk carriers will be able to go directly to Montreal
and Quebec. More important, it will reduce the cost of
transporting wheat to the Atlantic coast via the Seaway
to such a low point that it seems unlikely that other
forms of transport will be able to compete. TABLE I shows
that, as of 1951, the per bushel rate from the head of the
lakes to port would have been 16" cheaper via the Seaway
to Montreal than via any route to New York. If we assume,
as we did in CHAPTER I, that the more efficient 20,Q0-ton
carriers will come increasingly into use, the differential
would be even larger.
So large is the differential that it seems unlikely
that Canadian grain will be exported through American
ports once the Seaway is built except during the winter
season. t 1bis will be true, however, only if the elevator
and pier facilities are expanded at Montreal (and at
Quebec as a secondary port) sufficiently to handle the
increased wheat traffic.
Rather than Canadian wheat moving through American
ports, then, it is entirely possible that some American
wheat might be diverted to Montreal instead. This would
happen, to be sure, only if economic forces were allowed
to operate unhampered by institutional considerations. The
magnitude or even existence of this potential traffic is
so bard to predict, however, that TABLE 2 and CHART I
were constructed on the basis of Canadian wheat exports
alone.
Potential Grain Traffic
CHART I shows past Canadian wheat exports and a pro-
jection for the future. It is assumed, that, despite yearly
fluctuations, the general trend of Canadian wheat exportation
will continue upward reaching about 300 million bushels in
1960. Bad crop years or shifts in the world political and
trade situation could easily modify that total, however.
TABLE 2 shows that exports of Canadian wheat through
American east coast ports has remained about 25% of total
Canadian exports up to the present. It is assumed that
this rate will continue until the opening of the Seaway in
1959. At that juncture, however, it is expected that the
traffic through American ports will fall to 5% of total
Canadian exports, mostly off-season business. Jhe remain-
ing 20% will be diverted to Seaway transport with trans-
shipment and exportation at Montreal. Other Canadian ports
may show slight increases, but the cost advantages of
Montreal are so large that the other Canadian ports will
probably remain largely off-season exporters.
On the basis of our 300 million bushel projection for
1960, this 20% diversion will mean 60 million bushels of
new wheat business for Montreal whose traffic, even without
the Seaway, should have reached 75 million bushels by that
time. This total of 135 million bushels will flow through
Montreal only if port and elevator facilities are substantially
increased to handle this traffic, however.
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Conclusions
The construction of the Seaway, with its attendant
cost advantages for the port of Montreal, will mean a
loss of business for the American ports of New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Boston and Portland will
also lose but by a lesser amount since only minor Uanadian
wheat shipments trickle through these ports even under
present circumstances. If American export wheat is also
diverted to the Seaway, all the American ports stand to
lose even more,
Buffalo, however, stands to lose the most. This
port, the major wheat transshipment and storage point in
the Great Lakes area, will lose almost all of its Canadian
wheat traffic. Whereas the loss of export business will
be divided among Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
and Baltimore, the loss of wheat transshipment business
will be concentrated on Buffalo.
On the Canadian side, only Port Colborne seems destined
to lose very much. Elimination of the necessity for trans-
shipment here, as at Buffalo, will cause a substantial
reduction in wheat traffic.
Montreal stands to gain by far the most. As the natural
gateway to the Atlantic from the Seaway, Montreal will find
its wheat traffio greatly increased or even doubled by
virtue of the transport economies involved in the use of
8/
the Seaway. This increase will not only bring new income
to Montreal, but-also will probably stimulate other
economic activity.
8/ Other writers have reached the same conclusions. Zeis
states, "...there does not appear to be much question
that the overwhelming flow of eastward grain will be
via Seaway to Montreal, with the United States North
Atlantic ports losing all or most of their grgin
exports durin the open season of navigation. Ref.
"An Economic ppraisal of the St. Lawrence Seaway
Project," op. cit., P. 45.
r
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TABLE I --- COST OF TRANSPORTING A BUSHEL OF WHEAT FROM THE
HEAD OF THE LAKES TO SHIPSIDE AT SELECTED PORTS
METHOD OF TRANSPORT PORT COST
All-water via Buffalo
Water-rail "
New York
New York
Water-rail " Boston 25} (a)
I, ft U
It It St It
All-water
Water-rail
All-water
"t "
" (Port Colborne)
" Georgian Bay Ports
" Seaway (15K- on carrier)
" " (20K- on carrier)
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
25 (a)
25 (a)
16
18
98
8
(a)
(b)
(c )
(c)
(a) Based on the testimony of John H. Frazier, Director of
the Commercial Exchange of Philadelphia, before the
Senate Sub-Committee oreign Relations, op. cit., pp.
671-4.
(b) Based on "An Egonomic Appraisal of the St. Lawrence
Seaway Project , TABLE 14, op. cit., p. 36 with figure
corrected to correspond to the 1951 date of the
figures covered by note (a).
(c) Based on figures presented in "An Economic Appraisal
of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project, " op. cit., p. 39,
corrected to correspond to the 1951 date of the figures
covered by note (a) and to include the Seaway toll of
35# per net ton plus 15# per deadweight ton return.
General Note:
All of the above figures are for 1951, the latest
available. It can be safely assumed that all rates
are presently higher, but that their relative values
remain the same.
25
25U
(a)
(a)
TABLE 2---CANADIAN WHEAT EXPORTS VIA U.S. EAST COAST PORTS (In Ui11ions of Bushels)
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 k941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1951
Total Canadian 173.2 145.8
Exports
Via U.S.
East Coast
% U.S. Ports
of Total
28.2 23.6
16.3 16.2
77.1 129.1 152.7 184.9 161.5 143.3 123.3 238.4 265.7 293.9(a)
14.2 11.2 59.6 55.6 49.8 64.9 47.3 82.0 67.8 75.0(b)
18.4 8.6 39.0 30.1 30.8 45.3 38.4 34.4 25.5 25.5
Source: "An Economic Appraisal of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project," op. cit., P.23
(a) Canadian Statistical Review, April 1951 and Dec 1953, Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa.
(b) From the bearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., Pp.
671-4.
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CHAPTER III: EFFECTS ON COAL TRANSPORT
Scope of Analss
As we have already seen in CHAPTER I, construction of
the Seaway will not affect the cost of coal at American
points which can already be served by bulk lakes carrier
or directly by rail. It will, however, affect the cost
of delivering coal to Canadian points served by the
Seaway. Although Toronto is nominally one of these points,
the present dimensions of the Welland canal make it possible
for bulk-type carriers to enter Lake Ontario and serve
Toronto efficiently. Of the other Canadian points included
in TABLE 4, CHAPTER4,Kingston has the same present advantages
as Toronto, while 7 Islands, without a steel industry, will
not consume enough coal to make it a crucial point.
This study, then, will consider only the delivery of
coal to the Province of Quebec, mainly through the port
of Montreal.
Nova Scotia vs. American Coal
Quebec has no cbal resource of any importance. Nearby
Nova Bcotia, however, has long been one of Canada's major
coal-producing provinces-providing 43.7% of Canadian
production in 1956. For a variety of reasons, however,
r
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1/
this percentage had dropped to 30.6 by 1946. Difficulties
of underwater mining in depleted mines have doubtless had
much to do with this. More important, however, has been
the decline in productivity of the Nova Scotian miner.
This amounted to a drop from 2.54 tons per man-day in 1934
to 1.73 tons per man-day in 1944.
During the same period, the American miner's productivity
was increasing from 4.23 tons per man-day to 6.78 tons per
man-day. Apparently nothing has happened to reverse either
of these trends, although there seems to be no reason why
Nova Scotian productivity could not be brought up to its
2/
prewar level even if it could not reach the American level.
In any case, the effect of these productivity shifts
has been to lower the F.O.B. mine cost of American coal
with respect to Nova Scotia coal. Whereas the F.O.B. mine
cost of Nova Scotia coal increased an average of *4.04 a
ton, the F.O.B. mine eost of American coal increased only
3/
an average of $2.32 during the same period.
Transport Cost Analysis
Obviously, the increasing advantage in F.O.B. mine cost
1/ "An Economic Appraisal of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project",
op. cit., p. 48.
2/ Ibid., p. 52.
3/ Ibid., p. 54
o^IO
of American coal would tend to offset transport advantages
of Nova Scotia coal. This is borne out by the figures.
In 1939 the total average cost of Nova Scotian coal at
Montreal was 10$ a ton less than the per-ton cost of
Pennsylvania-West Virginia coal at that point. By 1946,
however, American coal could be delivered dockside at
Montreal for an average of *1.50 per ton less than Nova
Scotia coal if transport was by canaler. Nova Scotia
coal, however, still had an average of 50$ advantage
over American coal which traveled all-rail from the
Pennsylvania-West Virginia fields.
The opening of the Seaway, however, will make the
disparity even larger. TABLE 4, CHAPTER I, shows that
with the Seaway, transport costs on American coal are
$5.13 or j4.86 a ton, depending on the type of carrier
used. It is fair to assume that the *1.50 price advantage
of American coal dockside at Montreal has been maintained
because cost increases in Canada have kept pace with those
4/
in the U.S. and Canadian import duties have not been raised.
Since the present transport cost on American coal via rail
4/ Ibid., p. 54. Canadian import duties on American coal were
not included in TABLE 4, CHAPT3 I, because this table
was based strictly on transport costs. Inclusion of the
import duties would not have affected the relative
competitive position as between Canadian production points
in any case. - Only the doubtful competitive position of
Montreal in the New York and New England Markets would
have been affected, but American import duties on
Canadian steel would have excluded Montreal from those
markets anyway.
5/
and canaller is $5.65 a ton, the reduction of this cost by
52$ or 795 in using the Seaway will raise the price advantage
of American coal to $2.02 or $2.29 a ton.
This advantage is so large that it seems unlikely
that Nova Scotia coal can possibly compete with American
coal once the Seaway is built. Even if Nova Scotian
productivity improves, the margin seems too great to
eliminate in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, there
is every reason to believe that American productivity
will also improve because the competition of other fuels
in the American United States has made the American producers
increasingly cost conscious.
Potential Coal Traffie
Recent estimates predict a Quebec market for 5 to 6.5
6/
million tons of coal annually. Add to this the 1.6 million
tons which will be needed to supply the predicted iron and
steel works and we find a coal traffic of 6.6 to 8.1
million tons entering the province mainly through the part
of Montreal. This figure is probably on the conservative
side since it does not take into account the coal needs of
other new industrial activity and population which will
probably be attracted to Montreal by the new steel and
wheat industries.
5/ See CHART 2, CHAPTER I.
6/ Ibid., p. 51.
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Conclusions
The construction of the Seaway will give American coal
producers such a large cost advantage in the Quebec Provincial
Market that they will virtually control it. Even if Nova
Scotia producers can out costs and prices to compete with
the American producers, they cannot supply more than 1.7
million tons annually without tremendous production
7/
increases. This advantageous position in the expanding
Quebee market will help American producers to make up for
some of their losses in the American market and thereby
benefit the coal-producing regions of Pennsylvania and
West Virginia.
On the Canadian side, the decreased cost of coal at
Montreal will help make possible an integrated iron and
steel works at that point. Furthermore, the lowered cost
of coal at Montreal will serve as an added inducement to
industries which would like to locate near the steel supply.
The ultimate effect of the Seaway on coal transport,
then, will be significant growth in the economic activity of
the Montreal area.
7/ Ibid., p. 51.
CHAPTER IV --.. EFFECTS ON GENERAL CARGO SHIPMENTS
Scope of Analysis
This chapter will be concerned only with general cargo
shipments by ocean-going vessel directly to or from points
along the Seaway Great Lakes route. Bulk commodities such
as iron ore, coal, and wheat are not included in this
analysis; not only are they covered elsewhere in this
report, but also they are unlikely to move through the
Seaway and the Lakes in ocean-going vessels in any sub-
stantial volume.
This analysis, therefore, will cover the importation
or exportation of general cargo by interior ports, and the
effects of the Seaway on this traffic.
Present General Cargo Traffic
Ports on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Waterway
system are already being served directly by ocean-going
vessels. These vessels, known as "canallers," are especially
designed for passage through the restrictive looks of the
present canal system. The typical "canaller" has a length
of 254 feet, a width of 43.6 feet, and a loaded draft of
14 feet which just allows it to navigate the Lachine lock
at Montreal, smallest of the looks in the present canal
64-
1/
system.
All of the present "canallers" are owned and operated
by foreign concerns. The high costs of American labor make
it prohibitively expensive for American concerns to compete
in this small-vessel trade. Furthermore, the government
subsidies which keep the U.S. Merchant Marine in operation
apply only on officially designated routes. The Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence route is not so designated, nor is it
likely to be unless the traffic on it increases manyfold.
Even with the subsidy, however, American operators would
2/
find it hard to compete with low-cost foreign vessels.
TABLE I shows the growth of General Cargo Traffic
between 1946 and 1951. The imports have consisted mostly of
wood pulp, iron and steel fabricated products, clays and
earths, and aluminum ores, concentrates, base alloys and
scrap, plus lesser amounts of manufactured products. The
exports have been mainly petroleum coke, iron and steel
products, automobiles and various types of machinery, and
foodstuffs.
The growth of this traffic, even with the inefficiency
1/ Harold M. Mayer, "Great Lakes-Overseas, An Expanding Trade
Route," Economic Geography, Volume 30, No. 2, April, 1954,
p. 117.
2/ Ibid., p. 142
3/ Ibid., pp. 132-4
r
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of the small-sized vessels and the tortuousness of the
present St. Lawrence route, is due to a number of factors.
Basically the foreign ship operators, with their low wage
scales, have been able to keep their all-water rates
competitive with the rail-water rates via East Coast ports.
But more than that, Midwest importers and exporters, both
in the United States and Canada, have found that direct
shipping avoids the losses involved in the extra handling,
delays in loading, and possible labor strikes at East
Coast ports. Low-weight, high-value products such as
liquor and delicate machinery have been moving increasingly
by direct shipment to avoid the breakage and pilferage
47
losses encountered at Atlantic transshipment points.
Actually, the St. Lawrence route to and from Europe is
shorter than might be expected since it lies along the
great circle route to that continent. Chicago to Antwerp
via the St. Lawrence, for example, is only 189 miles longer
than the rail-water route via New York. This means that
all-water transport is competitive in speed as well as cost
with the rail-water transport via the East Coast.
The vessel operators apparently expect their business
to grow even without the Seaway. Almost all the present
4/ Ibid., p. 131.
j
operators have now "canallers" under construction. Many of
these new vessels have a capacity of 3500 tons as opposed
5/
to the 2000 ton capacity of most of the existing ships.
Effects of the Seaway
There is every reason to expect, therefore, that direct
trade in general cargo between interior and foreign ports
will expand once the Seaway is built. The 27-foot proposed
depth for the Seaway will accommodate most foreign ocean-
going vessels. It will not, however, accommodate much of
the American Merchant Marine because the majority of American
vessels draw upwards of 30 feet in fresh water when fully
6/
loaded. In any case it is unlikely that American operators,
with their high labor costs, could compete in the overseas
trade with the use of the Seaway any better than they could
without it.
Once the Seaway is built, the ability of larger, more
efficient vessels to enter the Great Lakes will probably
5/ lbid., p. 126.
6/ From the testimony of Brig. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson,
Deputy Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 48.
General Robinson also pointed out, however, that 75%
of the U.S. Merchant Marine could navigate the 27-foot
channel if the ships were loaded to no more than an averag
of 80% of capacity. This would make it almost impossible
for American vessels to compete with fully-loaded foreign
ships, however.
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eliminate the "canallers" -from the waterway traffic. This will
not affect the operators of these small vessels too adversely,
however, since they can return to the "short sea" European
trade whieh is even now their major business during the winter
season when St. Lawrence is blocked by ice.
The most important effects of the Seaway will be on the
interior points which it will serve. If the businessmen
of the Midwest found it advantageous to trade via the
restricted St. Lawrence canal system, it seems logical
that they will find it even more advantageous to trade via
the Seaway. Transport costs are certain to be reduced by
the use of larger, more efficient vessels, while the other
advantages of direct shipments will remain.
With a substantial growth in direct trade between
foreign lands and Midwest points, these points will prosper
increasingly as transshipment centers. Such centers are
strategic spots for the location of economic activity.
Cargos, once unloaded, can most economically be processed
at the unloading point before they are transshiped to
another form of transportation.
Profit-seeking enterprise seeks to reduce production
7/ Harold M. Mayer, op. cit., p. 125.
8/ R.U. Ratoliff, Urban Land Economics, 1st Edition,
McGraw-Hill, Now York, 1949., pp. 34-37.
costs. Transport costs often make up a large proportion of
those costs. If an; industry can reduce its total transport
costs by locating on new and more economical transport routes
and by reducing transshipment charges on materials, it will
9/
usually try to do so.
Historically, most of our largest cities have grown up
at transshipment points. New York and other East Coast ports
are prime examples. Industry has congregated at these places
to take advantage of the lower costs involved in processing
goods before they are transshipped from water to rail.
Similarly, Chicago and other Midwest cities have grown up
at railway interchanges. The added advantage of becoming
major water-to-rail transfer points should materially help
10/
the lake ports to attract more industry.
In general, the ports farthest from the East Coast will
benefit the most by shipping via the Seaway. The high cost
of the long rail haul to the East Coast from such points as
Chicago and Detroit allows a wide margin for competition from
9/ E.M. Hoover, The Location of Economic Activity, 1st Edition,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1948.
10/ Dean has said, "the likelihood for establishment of
commercial agglomerations of first rate importance is
especially great where the primary land routes meet the
primary water routes.
W.H. Dean, The Theory of the Geographic Location of
Economic Activities, Rdwards, Ann Arbor, 1938, p. 37.
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the all-water route via the Seaway.
Cleveland and Buffalo should gain, too, but not as much.
The rail haul from Cleveland and the rail or barge haul from
Buffalo are not nearly as long as those from the western ports,
and therefore are not as susceptible to Seaway Competition.
Toronto, although it is fairly far east, still should
gain substantially from direct vessel service via the
Seaway. This is because Toronto is the major center of
industrial Canada, and the gateway to the most populous
Province of that country. Ports such as Fort William and
Port Arthur, although farther west, should not be expected
to gain as much as Toronto or interior American points
because of their restricted hinterland market and lack of
industrial potential.
Obviously, if interior points are to gain by direct
shipments of general cargo, East Coast points will suffer
by loss of some of their transshipment business and some of
the industry which a transshipment point attracts. Montreal,
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore would be expected to
lose the most because they are the major outlets for the
products of the midwest. Boston and Quebec would also
lose, but by a much smaller amount since only minor shipments
of midwest produce move through these ports.
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Conclusions
The eoimstruction of the Seaway will make possible a
considerable expansion of direct overseas trade in general
cargo between foreign ports and points served by the Seaway
by lowering the costs of getting products to market and
materials to industry. This expansion should therefore help
to stimulate the economic growth of these interior points.
Such expansion will be possible, however, only if the lake
and Seaway ports improve their already inadequate general
11/
cargo handling facilities.
On the American side, Chicago and Detroit stand to gain
the most. Cleveland and Buffalo will also benefit, but by a
less amount. New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia stand to
lose the most; Boston less.
On the Canadian side, Toronto should gain by far the
most while Fort William-Port Arthur and other minor lake
ports benefit only slightly. Conversely, Montreal should
lose by far the most with the adverse effects on Quebec and
other St. Lawrence points being only aligh t.
Note that the adverse effects on certain Atlantic ports
may be alleviated somewhat by the general increase in trade
stimulated by the use of the Seaway. It would be dangerous to
11/ Harold M. Mayer, op. cit., p. 141.
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predict, however, that this increase would be enough to
compensate for the losses these points will suffer in their
transshipment business and the industries associated with
that business.
Bear in mind, also, that unpredictable changes in the
foreign trade policy of the United States Government could
serve to either strengthen or weaken the effects on American
points.
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TABLE I --- GROWTH OF IRECT OVElEAS GENERAL CARGO TRAFFIC
AT ANERICAN GREAT LAES PORTS IN NET TONS OF
YEAR
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
IMPORTS
10,176
23,054
46,765
63,966
127,203
107,234
EXPORTS
20,148
43,720
43,406
73,618
84,874
103,667
TOTAL
30,324
66,774
90,171
137,584
212,077
210,901
Source: Harold M. Mayer, "Great Lakes-Overseas, An
Expanding Trade Route, "Economic Geo ra ,
Vol. 30, No. 2, April, 19 p. 29.
Mr. Mayer's table was compiled from the Annual
Reports of the U.S. Corps of Engineers.
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
American Points
In general, Midwest points will benefit from the trans-
port economies involved in the use of the Seaway while East
Coast points will suffer some loss. Chicago and Detroit
will benefit especially in their general cargo traffic while
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore lose somewhat. At
least part of this loss should be offset by general increases
in foreign trade stimulated by the Seaway. New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore will also suffer major declines
in their Canadian wheat exportations. Boston and Portland
will expect similar, but smaller, declines in their general
cargo and wheat traffic.
It does not appear that any American points will be
strongly affected by shifts in the iron and steel and coal
industries. Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland will probably
experience only the relatively minor loss of their iron and
steel export market in Canada. The coal-producing areas of
Pennsylvania and West Virginia will gain somewhat in increased
coal traffic to Montreal.
Of all American points, Buffalo will probably suffer the
largest losses. This point seems destined to lose the major
portion of its presently substantial business in the elevatorage
and transshipment of Canadian wheat. Furthermore, Buffalo,
the largest American supplier of steel to Canada, will
feel the loss of this market.
Canadian Points
Similarly, Canadian lake ports will undoubtedly benefit
from direct shipment of general cargo while the East Coast
ports will lose some of their transshipment business. With
respect to the commodities, however, the situation here is
very different. Although Port Colborne stands to lose much
of its fair-sized wheat transshipment business, other
Canadian ports show promise of gains much larger than any
to be found on the American side.
Montreal especially has a greatly increased future
economic potential due to the Seaway. Not only is it possible
to predict a vastly expanded wheat traffic through this port
and to contemplate the likelihood of an integrated iron and
steel works, but it is also possible to conclude that these
new activities, together with the lowered cost of coal, will
form a powerful stimulus wir future economic development in
the Montreal Area.
This future development will not benefit Montreal alone.
The growth which the Seaway will make possible in Montreal
should serve to stimulate the entire Canadian economy.
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